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Abstract
This paper studies the macroeconomic consequences of interbank market dis-
ruptions caused by higher counterparty risk. I propose a novel, dynamic model
of banking sector where banks trade liquidity in the frictional OTC market à
la Afonso and Lagos (2015) that features counterparty risk. The model is then
embedded into an otherwise standard New Keynesian framework to analyze the
macroeconomic impact of interbank market turmoils: economy suffers from a
prolonged slump and deflationary pressure during such episodes. I use the model
to analyze the effectiveness of two policy measures: rise in the supply of central
bank reserves and interbank market guarantees in mitigating the adverse effects
of those disruptions.
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1 Introduction
Extreme levels of interbank lending rates were one of the hallmarks of the financial
crisis of 2007-2008. A widely accepted interpretation of this phenomenon is that banks
lending liquidity in the market began to worry whether borrowing counterparties will
be able to repay loans.1 Indeed, several episodes of the 2007-2008 turmoil seem to
support the validity of this explanation. For example, the BNP Paribas announcement
concerning its inability to value structured products and the associated freezing of
redemptions for its investment funds triggered an illiquidity wave on the interbank
market in August 2007.2 As a result, the perceived default risks of banks increased
substantially driving up the LIBOR (see Brunnermeier (2009)).
Interbank market turmoils have serious macroeconomic consequences. First, they
weaken risk sharing between banks and lead to inadequate allocation of capital. Second,
since interbank markets are essential for banks’ liquidity management then tighter
borrowing conditions in that market force banks to cut back on real-sector lending.
Despite the prominent role played by counterparty risk in interbank market turmoils
and in spite of the macroeconomic importance of the latter, there are no works that
analyze those issues within a single framework. This paper is intended to bridge this
gap, by providing the first formal analysis of interbank market turmoils caused by a
rise in counterparty risk in a DSGE environment. To this end, I develop a dynamic
model of banking sector with banks trading liquidity in the frictional OTC market as
in Afonso and Lagos (2015) which is then embedded into the standard New Keynesian
framework. I use the model to analyze the impact of two policy measures: increase in
central bank reserves and introduction of interbank market guarantees.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, on the methodological side, it is the
first work that enables to organize our thinking about the macroeconomic consequences
1An alternative explanation of interbank market interest rate spikes emphasizes the role of liquidity
hoarding: banks are not willing to lend even to credible counterparties because they prefer to store
liquidity due to precautionary motives. The key insight of this theory is that bank’s supply of interbank
lending is determined by its own rollover risk (see Acharya and Skeie (2011)). Empirical work by Afonso
et al. (2011) indicates that counterparty risk played a more important role than liquidity hoarding
during the Fed funds market stress that followed Lehman Brothers collapse.
2Except for anecdotal evidence, there are works documenting those phenomena empirically. For
instance, Afonso et al. (2011) analyze the situation on the Fed funds market following the collapse
of Lehman Brothers and find that counterparty risk is a convincing explanation for the overnight
interbank market stress following this event.
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of the elevated levels of interbank market counterparty risk. Second, on the technical
side, I modify the construct by Bianchi and Bigio (2014) in a substantial way so that it
allows to formalize the notion of interbank market default risk within a dynamic model
of banking sector.
My paper is related to several strands of the literature. First group of works dis-
cusses the impact of shifts in the interbank market counterparty risk on banking sector
performance and liquidity dry-ups. For example, Heider et al. (2015) examine adverse
selection that may lead to market collapse. In their model, information asymmetry
worsens during a crisis when the fraction of risky banks rises and, at the same time,
investors cannot differentiate among default risks of individual banks. Consequently,
lenders demand higher interest payments to participate in the market. Similar mech-
anisms based on asymmetric information are present in works of Flannery (1996) and
Freixas and Jorge (2008). I contribute to this literature by extending those models
along two important dimensions. First, I replace the finite horizon optimization prob-
lems present in those works with an infinite one. Second, I introduce real sector so
that I am able to study macroeconomic effects of interbank market disruptions. Fur-
thermore, I formalize the notion of counterparty risk in a way that slightly differs from
the concept of asymmetric information. More precisely, asymmetric information is a
situation in which one party has more or better information than the other. In my
model, for tractability purposes, I constrain the number of possible actions by assum-
ing that lending in the interbank market takes place before certain proportion of banks
that borrow funds in that market is affected by insolvency shock. This means that all
borrowers are identical when interbank loans are made and hence those circumstances
cannot be referred to as information asymmetry. At the same time, to guarantee that
counterparty risk affects transactions in the interbank market, it is assumed that lend-
ing banks know the proportion of insolvent borrowers ex ante. However, they cannot
distinguish between sound and risky borrowers when granting a loan as both types are
virtually the same.
It seems that the closest paper to mine is Bianchi and Bigio (2014) who propose a
model of banks’ liquidity management and the credit channel of monetary policy and
apply it to study the driving forces behind the decline in lending and liquidity hoarding
by banks during the 2008 financial crisis. I modify the model of Bianchi and Bigio (2014)
in a significant way. First, I extend the frictional OTC market in which banks trade
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liquidity which is present in their analysis by introducing counterparty risk. Second, I
reformulate the model of Bianchi and Bigio (2014) by assuming that in the middle of the
period each bank is divided into a continuum units that are heterogeneously affected by
idiosyncratic shocks and which are again pooled into one bank by the midpoint of every
consecutive period.3 While retaining the intraperiod heterogeneity which gives rise to
trade in the interbank market as in Bianchi and Bigio (2014), this large-bank construct
simplifies the analysis in two ways. First, by eliminating the interperiod heterogeneity
across banks it simplifies aggregation and allows the use of broader (than in Bianchi and
Bigio (2014)) set of banker’s utility functions under which the model remains solvable.4
The latter is important as the liquidation protocols applied to insolvent bank units in my
analysis require specific utility functions of bankers. Second, this modification enables
embedding counterparty risk into the model in a tractable way and allows the use of
standard solution techniques like perturbation methods. This second issue implies that
the large-bank construct proposed in my work offers a tractable way of incorporating
a dynamic and relatively realistic banking sector into the standard DSGE framework.
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. In Section 3 I study the effects of an increase in the counterparty risk in the
interbank market. Section 4 describes the role of several policy measures in mitigating
the adverse consequences of interbank market turmoils. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Environment: general picture
Time is infinite and divided into discrete periods. Each period consists of two subpe-
riods: day and night. The model is populated by the following types of agents: banks
(bankers), households, firms and the consolidated government that collects taxes and
conducts monetary policy. Banks channel funds between those who save (households)
and those who take loans (firms). Households’ need for services provided by bankers
emerges because bank deposits are the only instrument available to shift purchase power
3This approach originates from Lucas (1990) and has been recently applied to households by, inter
alia, Beaudry et al. (2014), Shi (2015), Cui and Radde (2016) and Negro et al. (2017).
4The analysis of Bianchi and Bigio (2014) remains feasible only when homothetic preferences are
in place and resources available to bankers can be expressed as a linear function of equity.
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across periods. On the asset side of bank balance sheet, a simple financial friction gives
rise to demand for loans: firms have to pay workers before goods are produced and sold
so they take loans to cover payroll costs.
2.2 Financial sector without counterparty risk
2.2.1 Banks
It is instructive to start with a simplified version of the banking sector without counter-
party risk. There is a continuum of infinitely-lived banks of measure one. Each bank,
in turn, consists of a continuum of units of measure one. Banks are divided into sep-
arate units at the beginning of night and are consolidated by pooling separated units
at the end of day of the next period. Before the division, between day and night, each
bank makes decision about the composition of its balance sheet: deposits d, loans l and
reserves m and next period equity e given the value of equity chosen in the previous pe-
riod.5 This initial structure of balance sheet is then inherited by each unit and hence all
units are identical at the beginning of the night. During the night, however, some bank
units are subject to inflows and some experience outflows of proportion δ > −1 of de-
posits. This process is accompanied by changes in reserve balances as shifts of deposits
between two units are settled with reserves. The distribution of deposit withdrawals is
identical across banks and is denoted by µ that satisfies:
∫
δdµ (δ) = 0.
In other words, it is assumed that the circulation of deposits is closed within the banking
sector. Similarly to Bianchi and Bigio (2014) and Freixas et al. (2011), the role of
withdrawal shocks is to give rise to liquidity risk: between night and day, each unit is
obligated to hold a stock of reserves which equals the proportion ψ ≥ 0 of its current
deposit holdings (1 + δ) · d and hence bank units with reserve balances below this
requirement have to borrow them at the end of night. Units with reserve deficits can
borrow either from central bank or from units with surplus reserves in the interbank
market. The effective real rate of borrowing reserves χ− is defined later. Units with
5All balance sheet elements are expressed in real terms, i.e. in terms of consumption good which is
a numerairé in the model.
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Figure 1: Timeline for the banking sector
•Balance sheet decisions are made
•Banks are divided into separate units
•Units receive withdrawal shocks
•Trade in the interbank market takes place
•Units collect revenues and repay debt
•Consumption takes place
•Units are merged into one bank 
t 
-
1
t
reserve surpluses can either deposit them at central bank or lend them to units with
deficits. The effective real rate on surplus χ+ is defined later, too.
At the beginning of next period’s day, units collect revenues from loans to firms
and reserves and repay deposits (the associated nominal interest rates are iL, iER and
iD, respectively). Moreover, units experiencing reserve deficits at the end of night in
previous period, bear costs of borrowing and those who had surpluses receive interest
payments from lending in the interbank market or deposits at the Fed. Those resources
are then divided between consumption c(δ) of unit affected by shock δ at the end of
night, equity chosen in the previous period before the division into units and the penalty
for the deviation of equity from the level imposed by regulator e¯t.6 Finally, bank units
are pooled into one bank and decisions concerning bank balance sheet are made. The
order of events is presented in Figure 1.
Each unit values consumption c(δ), which can be thought of as a dividend, using
a strictly increasing, concave and twice-differentiable function u.7 Additionally, it is
required that u(0) = 0 and u′(c) → +∞. First assumption simplifies the modeling
of liquidation procedures discussed in Subsection 2.3. Second condition guarantees
existence of the interior solution to the bank problem. Banks discount future utility
6The last element is introduced for several reasons. First, it enables to pin down the steady state
level of equity in the model and guarantees the convergence of the model after a transitory shock.
Second, it penalizes banks if the chosen level is lower than e¯t (violation of capital requirement). If
banks choose level that exceeds e¯t, it can be treated as tax on equity. More generally, such penalty
makes banks decrease the volatility of equity which is consistent with the observations made by Adrian
et al. (2012).
7Similarly to Bianchi and Bigio (2014), curvature in the objective function is introduced to generate
dividend smoothing which is observed empirically.
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streams with factor βB ∈ (0, 1) and it is assumed that they are not able to transfer
resources across units during the spells in which they are separated. Finally, it is
assumed that banks formulate rational expectations about the evolution of aggregate
state variables A captured by operator Γ:
At = Γ (At−1) .
The following Bellman equation describes the problem of bank which is solved between
day and night:
V (et−1, At−1) = max
xt
{∫ +∞
−1
u (ct (δ)) dµ (δ) + βB · EV (et, At)
}
(1)
subject to :
∀δ : ct (δ) + et + φE2 · (et − e¯t)
2 = 1 + iL,t−1Πt
· lt−1 (2)
+1 + iER,t−1Πt
·
(
mt−1 +
1 + iD,t−1
1 + iER,t−1
· δ · dt−1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Reserve balances after withdrawal shock
+1 + iD,t−1Πt
· (dt−1 + δ · dt−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Deposits after withdrawal shock
+
(
I{δ<δ∗t−1} · χ
−
t + I{δ≥δ∗t−1} · χ
+
t
)
· M (mt−1, dt−1|iD,t−1, iL,t−1, δ)
lt−1 +mt−1 = et−1 + dt−1 (3)
At = Γ (At−1)
where xt−1 = {{ct (δ)} , lt−1,mt−1, dt−1, et}, φE > 0 is a parameter, V is value function
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associated with the maximization problem, Πt is the ratio between prices of consump-
tion goods pt in period t and those observed in t−1 andM is surplus/deficit of reserves
given by:
M (mt−1, dt−1|iD,t−1, iL,t−1, δ) = mt−1 + 1 + iD,t−11 + iER,t−1 · δ · dt−1 − ψ · (1 + δ) · dt−1.
By I I denote the indicator function and δ∗t−1 is the threshold value of δ for which the
surplus of reserves equals 0:
mt−1 +
1 + iD,t−1
1 + iER,t−1
· δ∗t−1 · dt−1 − ψ ·
(
1 + δ∗t−1
)
· dt−1 = 0.
First constraint of the maximization problem 1 is the budget constraint of a unit affected
by shock δ. Second constraint is the balance sheet constraint for a bank in period t−1.
Several remarks are in order. First, notice that, similarly to Bianchi and Bigio
(2014), I adopt a convention that a unit that issues deposit pays the interest for it -
i.e., it settles the withdrawal of its deposits by transferring the corresponding amount
of reserves plus rate iD. Analogously, a unit that purchases reserves is entitled to
interest paid by central bank on excess reserve holdings iER. These assumptions imply
that a unit that receives shock δ gets amount 1+iD1+iER · δ · dt of reserves. Second remark
concerns the sources of risk faced by bank units. Its primary source is the presence of
idiosyncratic shocks δ: the possibility of deposit outflows and the associated costs of
borrowing reserves discourages banks from choosing balance sheets characterized with
high leverage which constrains the intermediation process. If I did not assume that
banks cannot shift resources between units then it would be optimal to equalize c (δ)
across them which, in turn, would eliminate the intermediation risk. Similarly, if I
assumed that et can be chosen at the unit level then banks would set lower equity
holdings for units affected by low values of δ and higher equity holdings for units with
larger δ so that c (δ) would be equal across bank units and full insurance would be
achieved.8
The presence of idiosyncratic risk faced by units coupled with conditions in the
interbank market - captured by real rates χ+ and χ− - are essential for the level of prices
at which banks transfer resources between savers (households) and borrowers (firms).
8Of course, to achieve this result regulator would need to impose capital requirements that depend
on δ as well.
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To see that, let us analyze two first order conditions associated with the maximization
problem described by equation 1. First of them is related to the choice of mt−1 and
reads:
iL,t−1 = iER,t−1 + Πt ·
P
(
δ < δ∗t−1
)
· Eδ
(
u′ (ct (δ)) |δ < δ∗t−1
)
· χ−t
Eδ (u′ (ct (δ)))
+Πt ·
P
(
δ ≥ δ∗t−1
)
· Eδ
(
u′ (ct (δ)) |δ ≥ δ∗t−1
)
· χ+t
Eδ (u′ (ct (δ)))
(4)
where Eδ is an operator associated with random variable δ. Equation 4 implies that
conditions in the interbank market, described by effective real rates χ+ and χ−, translate
directly into changes in iL. Moreover, the lower bound on rate at which firms take loans
iL is pinned down by policy rate iER. Second condition is associated with deposits dt−1:
iD,t−1 = iL,t−1 (5)
+Πt ·
P
(
δ < δ∗t−1
) · Eδ (u′ (ct (δ)) · [δ˜t−1 − ψ · (1 + δ)] |δ < δ∗t−1) · χ−t
Eδ (u′ (ct (δ)))
+Πt ·
P
(
δ ≥ δ∗t−1
) · Eδ (u′ (ct (δ)) · [δ˜t−1 − ψ · (1 + δ)] |δ ≥ δ∗t−1) · χ+t
Eδ (u′ (ct (δ)))
where the sum of last two terms determines the spread between rate on loans iL and rate on
deposits iD. To economize on notation I have introduced a new symbol:
δ˜t ≡ 1 + iD,t1 + iER,t · δ.
Finally, by combining first order condition that corresponds to et with envelope condition I
obtain the following Euler equation:
(1 + φE · (et − e¯t)) · Eδ
(
u′ (ct (δ))
)
= βB · E
[(1 + iL,t
Πt+1
)
· Eδ
(
u′ (ct+1 (δ))
)]
. (6)
2.2.2 Interbank market
Fed funds market opens after arrival of withdrawal shocks and closes at the end of night.
It is specified as a frictional OTC market in which banks place borrowing and lending
orders. Matching between orders is governed by a constant returns to scale technology
M which implies matching probabilities for a bank with deficit of reserves ψ− and for
a bank with reserve surplus ψ+ that depend on Fed funds market tightness θFF given
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by the ratio of aggregate deficit of reserves and aggregate surplus of reserves:
θFF,t =
Dt
St (7)
where:
Dt ≡
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ δ∗t
−1
(
mt +
1 + iD,t
1 + iER,t
· δ · dt − ψ · (1 + δ) · dt
)
dµ (δ)
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
St ≡
∫ +∞
δ∗t
(
mt +
1 + iD,t
1 + iER,t
· δ · dt − ψ · (1 + δ) · dt
)
dµ (δ) .
It is assumed that orders unmatched in the market are automatically matched with
central bank which occurs with probability 1 − ψ− for a borrowing order and with
probability 1 − ψ+ for a lending order. If a unit of excess reserves is matched with a
borrowing order it earns Fed funds rate iFF and it earns interest on excess reserves iER
otherwise. If borrowing order is matched with lending order then the loan cost amounts
to iFF , and it equals to discount rate iDW if it is traded with central bank. This implies
the following values of real effective interest rates:
χ+t = ψ+t−1 ·
iFF,t−1 − iER,t−1
Πt
,
χ−t = ψ−t−1 ·
iFF,t−1 − iER,t−1
Πt
+
(
1− ψ−t−1
)
· iDW,t−1 − iER,t−1Πt .
Both iDW and iER are set by the monetary authority. The value of iFF is determined
during the bargaining process, which is described in the Appendix. In the situation in
which banks have equal bargaining weights, as it is assumed here, it takes the following,
intuitive form:
iFF,t =
iER,t + iDW,t
2 .
2.3 Financial sector with counterparty risk
2.3.1 The counterparty risk shock
Let us turn to the situation in which bank units face counterparty risk when trading
in the interbank market. The risk comes from the fact that at the beginning of day
of period t, measure 1 − St−1 of bank units, which is distributed equally across all
banks, faces problems with loan repayment. More precisely, firms repay all loans lt−1
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that are due but (1− St−1) · lt−1 of them “disappear” on their way to bank units which
means that proportion 1 − St−1 of deposits (1 + iD,t−1) · dt−1 cannot be repaid and
thus those “risky” units become insolvent. This is the moment in which government
steps in and the liquidation procedure begins. First, government confiscates equity et of
risky units and it reduces their “dividends” ct (δ) to zero. Second, it repays deposits of
insolvent units as I assume that deposit insurance is in place and hence the possibility
of bank runs is eliminated. In contrast to household deposits, government does not
repay interbank loans during liquidation process.9 This means that units which have
reserve surpluses between periods t − 1 and t are directly exposed to default risk as
interbank loans are not collateralized (as it is the case in reality).
I assume that the value of shock St−1 becomes known when banks choose their
balance sheet structure in period t−1. This implies that St−1 affects both the interbank
trade during the night of period t− 1 and balance sheet decisions made in the middle
of period t−1. In particular, as we shall see below, the presence of 1−St−1 of insolvent
units in period t will affect the price of interbank loans iFF,t−1. I adopt the convention
that insolvent units are only among those with reserves deficits so I need to assume
additionally that:
∀t : 1− St−1 < P
(
δ < δ∗t−1
)
i.e., the proportion of risky units does not exceed the number of borrowers. The presence
of insolvent units among loan takers gives rise to counterparty risk faced by units with
reserve surpluses at the end of period t− 1 as they cannot distinguish between safe and
risky borrowers in the interbank market ex ante.
2.3.2 Banks
The maximization problem of a bank in period t − 1 is characterized by the following
Bellman equation:
V (et−1, St−1, At−1) = max
xt
{∫ +∞
δ∗t−1
u (ct (δ)) dµ (δ) (8)
9By removing this assumption I study the role of interbank market guarantees.
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+
St−1 − P
(
δ ≥ δ∗t−1
)
P (δ < δ∗t−1)
·
∫ δ∗t−1
−1
u (ct (δ)) dµ (δ) + (1− St−1) · u (0)
+βB · EV (et, St, At)}
subject to :
∀δ : ct (δ) + et + φE2 · (et − e¯t)
2 = 1 + iL,t−1Πt
· lt−1 (9)
+1 + iER,t−1Πt
·
(
mt−1 +
1 + iD,t−1
1 + iER,t−1
· δ · dt−1
)
+ 1 + iD,t−1Πt
· (1 + δ) · dt−1
+
(
I{δ<δ∗t−1} · χ
−
t + I{δ≥δ∗t−1} · χ
+
t (St−1)
)
· M (mt−1, dt−1|iD,t−1, iL,t−1, δ)
lt +mt = St−1 · et + dt (10)
{St, At} = Γ (St−1, At−1)
There are several differences between the problem of a bank in environment without
counterparty risk and the one characterized by equations 8-10. First, in addition to
units’ heterogeneity with respect to withdrawal shocks, Bellman equation 8 captures
the fact that some units become insolvent. In particular, [S − P (δ ≥ δ∗)] /P (δ < δ∗)
is the proportion of solvent units in the pool of those with reserve deficits. Second,
equation 8 takes into account that there are units whose loan portfolios become non-
performing which implies that they undergo the liquidation procedure. In particular,
they do not receive consumption goods and hence the utility they derive is u(0) which
is well-defined and equal to 0 thanks to assumptions about u. Moreover, government
confiscates equity of risky units. I assume that, after the liquidation process, insolvent
bank units are pooled together with the remaining units and they continue to operate
in the future.
12
Budget constraint of bank units with surplus reserves become slightly different, too.
It is because, as we shall see in the coming subsection, the real effective rate on reserve
surplus becomes dependent on St−1. This is intuitive as interbank market lenders face
counterparty risk. Finally, notice that liquidation process affects the balance sheet
constraint 10: since government confiscates equity of insolvent units then bank is left
with St−1 · et of capital between day and night of period t. This, in turn, hampers
lending as banks have less resources to supply loans. It is useful to define aggregate
equity of a bank Et as:
Et ≡ St−1 · et.
First order condition with respect to mt−1 becomes:
iL,t−1 = iER,t−1 + Πt ·
(
St−1 − P
(
δ ≥ δ∗t−1
))
· Eδ
(
u′ (ct (δ)) |δ < δ∗t−1
)
· χ−t
Z
(
δ∗t−1, St−1, {ct (δ)}δ∈(−1,+∞)
)
+Πt ·
P
(
δ ≥ δ∗t−1
)
· Eδ
(
u′ (ct (δ)) |δ ≥ δ∗t−1
)
· χ+t (St−1)
Z
(
δ∗t−1, St−1, {ct (δ)}δ∈(−1,+∞)
) . (11)
where Z is defined as:
Z
(
δ∗t−1, St−1, {ct (δ)}δ∈(−1,+∞)
)
≡ P
(
δ ≥ δ∗t−1
)
· Eδ
(
u′ (ct (δ)) |δ ≥ δ∗t−1
)
+
(
St−1 − P
(
δ ≥ δ∗t−1
))
· Eδ
(
u′ (ct (δ)) |δ < δ∗t−1
)
.
Equation that pins down the nominal rate iD (i.e., the first order condition associated
with dt−1) becomes:
iD,t−1 = iL,t−1 (12)
+Πt ·
(
St−1 − P
(
δ ≥ δ∗t−1
))
· Eδ
(
u′ (ct (δ)) ·
[
δ˜t−1 − ψ · (1 + δ)
]
|δ < δ∗t−1
)
· χ−t
Z
(
δ∗t−1, St−1, {ct (δ)}δ∈(−1,+∞)
)
+Πt ·
P
(
δ ≥ δ∗t−1
)
· Eδ
(
u′ (ct (δ)) ·
[
δ˜t−1 − ψ · (1 + δ)
]
|δ ≥ δ∗t−1
)
· χ+t (St)
Z
(
δ∗t−1, St−1, {ct (δ)}δ∈(−1,+∞)
) .
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Finally, the Euler equation reads:
(1 + φE · (et − e¯t)) · Z
(
δ∗t−1, St−1, {ct (δ)}δ∈(−1,+∞)
)
(13)
= βB · E
[(
1 + iL,t
Πt+1
)
· St · Z
(
δ∗t , St, {ct+1 (δ)}δ∈(−1,+∞)
)]
.
2.3.3 Interbank market
Let us discuss how the interbank market with counterparty risk works. Notice that the
formula for market tightness 7 is not affected by changes in S. This is because all units
are ex ante identical before receiving the withdrawal and insolvency shocks. Since ψ+
and ψ− are functions of θFF then they are not affected either. I assume that insolvent
units are only among borrowers and hence the formula for effective rate χ− remains
unaffected, too. Formula for the real effective rate on surplus reserves χ+ (S) takes into
account that some interbank loans will be repaid and some will be not:
χ+t (St−1) =
St−1 − P
(
δ ≥ δ∗t−1
)
P
(
δ < δ∗t−1
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Probability that
counterparty is
safe/solvent
·ψ+t−1 ·
iFF,t−1 − iER,t−1
Πt
+ 1− St−1
P
(
δ < δ∗t−1
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Probability that
counterparty is
risky/insolvent
·ψ+t−1 ·
(
−1 · 1Πt
)
.
Observe that if S = 1 then χ+ (S) is identical to χ+. If, however S < 1 then with some
probability bank that lends surplus reserves loses the entire amountM which gives rise
to −1 in the formula above. Price index Π in denominator translates nominal terms
into real terms.
As it is shown in the Appendix, the formula for Fed funds rate reads:
iFF,t =
iER,t + iDW,t +
The counterparty
risk component︷ ︸︸ ︷
1− St
St − P (δ ≥ δ∗t )
2 . (14)
Intuitively, other things equal, lower proportion of safe units in the pool S increases
the interbank lending rate.
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2.4 Households
There is measure one of identical, infinitely-lived households. They value consump-
tion good c by using felicity function u˜ which is increasing, strictly concave, twice-
differentiable and satisfies the Inada conditions. Future utility streams are discounted
with factor βH ∈ (0, 1). There is no disutility from work so labor supply is perfectly
elastic and hence employment n is driven solely by labor demand. Moreover, it is as-
sumed that labor supply is bounded by unity. The only saving instrument available to
households are bank deposits d˜ earning nominal interest iD. Household income consists
of firm profits pi and labor income w · n where w is real wage. Each household pays
lump sum tax τ levied by government.
Bellman equation which represents household problem reads:
W
(
d˜t−1, St, At
)
= max
ct,d˜t
{
u˜ (ct) + βH · EW
(
d˜t, St+1, At+1
)}
(15)
subject to :
τt + ct + d˜t =
1 + iD,t−1
Πt
· d˜t−1 + wt · nt + pit (16)
{St+1, At+1} = Γ (St, At)
where W is value function associated with maximization problem 15. Observe that
timing of decisions is different than in case of bankers: households make decisions about
period t variables in period t and not in t− 1 as it is in case of banks. The associated
Euler equation is:
u˜ (ct) = βH · E
[
1 + iD,t
Πt+1
· u˜ (ct+1)
]
. (17)
2.5 Retailers
The model is populated with perfectly competitive retailers who pack differentiated
goods yi produced by firms into baskets of consumption goods y using technology
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described by the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator:
yt =
(∫ 1
0
y
1− 1
γ
i,t di
) 1
1− 1γ
where γ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods (varieties).
Retailers choose {yi,t} to maximize profits:
pt · yt −
∫ 1
0
pi,tyi,tdi
where pi,t is price of variety produced by firm i in period t. The following equation
describes first order condition of the retailer:
yi,t =
(
pi,t
pt
)−γ
· yt (18)
where pt reads:
pt =
(∫ 1
0
p1−γi,t di
) 1
1−γ
.
2.6 Firms
There is measure one of firms owned by households and indexed with i ∈ [0, 1] that
produce intermediate goods using linear technology with labor n as the only input.
Firms are monopolistically competitive and set prices subject to quadratic price ad-
justment costs as in Rotemberg (1982) and subject to demand for their products given
by equation 18. Future profit streams are discounted with factor Λ which depends on
household’s marginal utilities from consumption. It is assumed that firms operate under
simple financial friction: workers demand payment for wages before output is generated
and sold. This implies that firms have to take loans l˜ to finance payroll costs. Loans
are repaid in the next period.
Bellman equation associated with firm’s problem is:
Fi
(
pi,t−1, l˜i,t−1, St, At
)
= max
pi,t,li,t,ni,t,yi,t
{
pi,t
pt
· yi,t − 1 + iL,t−1Πt · l˜i,t−1
16
−φ2
(
pi,t − pi,t−1
pi,t−1
)2
· yt + EΛt · Fi
(
pi,t, l˜i,t, St+1, At+1
) (19)
subject to :
l˜i,t = wt · ni,t (20)
yi,t = ni,t
yi,t =
(
pi,t
pt
)−γ
· yt
{St+1, At+1} = Γ (St, At)
where φ > 0 is parameter, Fi is value function associated with the maximization
problem of firm i and Λ is defined as:
Λt = βH · u˜
′ (ct+1)
u˜′ (ct)
.
In the symmetric equilibrium, in which all firms are identical and hence subscripts i
can be omitted, first order condition that characterizes the optimal solution to problem
19 reads:
0 = 1− γ − φ · (Πt − 1) · Πt (21)
+EΛt ·
(
γ · 1 + iL,tΠt+1 · wt + φ · (Πt+1 − 1) · Πt+1 ·
yt+1
yt
)
.
Finally, let us define the real value of firm’s profits pi:
pit ≡ nt − 1 + iL,t−1Πt · l˜t−1 −
φ
2 · (Πt − 1)
2 · nt. (22)
2.7 Government
Government consists of central bank and fiscal authority that are consolidated under
single budget constraint:
Ct+ 1 + iER,t−1Πt ·St−1 ·m˜t−1 = m˜t+τt+
(
St−1 − P
(
δ ≥ δ∗t−1
))
+St−1 ·φE2 ·(et − e¯t)
2 (23)
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×
(
1− ψ−t−1
)
· iDW,t−1 − iIOR,t−1Πt ·
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ δ∗t−1
−1
M (mt−1, dt−1|iD,t−1, iL,t−1, δ)
∣∣∣∣∣ dµ (δ)
where m˜ is the amount of reserves supplied by central bank, C are costs associated
with liquidation procedures. Equation 23 states that government issues reserves, col-
lects taxes, penalties associated with violation of capital requirements and profits from
discount window operations to cover costs of liquidation procedures and payments on
excess reserves. Costs of compensations are given by:
Ct = (1− St−1) · 1 + iD,t−1Πt · dt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
deposit insurance
(24)
− (1− St−1) · ψ+t−1 ·
∫ +∞
δ∗t−1
M (mt−1, dt−1|iD,t−1, iL,t−1, δ) .︸ ︷︷ ︸
unsecured interbank lending
where the first component of compensations are deposits of liquidated bank units that
are repaid by government to households. As it has been already mentioned, this is a
standard deposit insurance that prevents from the emergence of bank runs. Costs of
compensations are reduced by the amount of loans on which liquidated banks default.
This happens because interbank lending is unsecured and government is not obliged to
repay this debt after the takeover of bank units in course of the liquidation process.
Additionally, government sets policy rates iDW and iER which are assumed to be
constant in my analysis and adjusts taxes τ and reserves m to balance the budget.
Finally government sets the reserve requirement parameter ψ and capital requirements
that are assumed to take the following form:
e¯t = ξ · (mt + lt) . (25)
In other words, banks are forced to hold equity equal to proportion ξ ∈ (0, 1) of their
asset holdings.
2.8 Consistency and market clearing
The market clearing condition for consumption goods reads:
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ct +
∫ +∞
−1
ct (δ) dµ (δ) +
φ
2 (Πt − 1)
2 · yt = yt.
It is required that markets for deposits, loans and reserves clear, too:
dt = d˜t, lt = l˜t, mt = m˜t.
It is assumed that there is a constant returns to scale matching technology M that
combines borrowing and lending orders in the interbank market. It implies the following
values of probabilities ψ+ and ψ−:
ψ+t =
M (Dt,St)
St = M (1, θFF,t) ,
ψ−t =
M (Dt,St)
Dt = M
(
1, 1
θFF,t
)
.
The last issue associated that needs to be addressed before defining equilibrium is
associated with wage formation. Since labor supply is perfectly elastic then employment
level is pinned down by demand for labor. This assumption is made to simplify the
model and is motivated by results presented in Justiniano et al. (2010) who claim that
labor supply is irrelevant for business cycle fluctuations. This implies that we have
certain degree of freedom in setting wages so following Blanchard and Gali (2010), I
assume that real wage is a function of labor productivity. As the latter is normalized
and constant over time (the only exogenous shock in the model is S) then real wages
w are constant over time and calibrated to match unemployment level in stationary
equilibrium.10
Finally, vector of aggregate state variables At consists of employment at the begin-
ning of period t, prices of consumption goods set in t − 1 and equity chosen by banks
in t− 1:11
At = {pt−1, et} .
10Real wage rigidities are important for obtaining a prolonged slump after the shock to S.
11For clarity, I do not include shock S in vector A.
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2.9 Equilibrium
Having defined maximization problems of banks, households and firms, government
budget constraint and market clearing conditions, we are in position to define recursive
competitve equilibrium of the model:
Definition. A recursive competitive equilibrium is: value functions V , W , F , policy func-
tions x, c, d˜, p, l˜, n, y, real rates χ+, χ−, probabilities ψ+, ψ− implied by θFF , threshold
value δ∗, profits pi, discount factor Λ, aggregate price level index Π and nominal rates iFF , iL,
iD such that given taxes τ , supply of reserves m˜, reserve requirements ψ, capital requirements
ξ, rates iDW , iER, real wage w and path of shocks S:
1. Value function V solves the problem of bank (equation 8) given δ∗, S, iL, iD, iER, Π,
χ+, χ−and x is vector of the associated policy functions,
2. Value function W solves the problem of household (equation 15) given Π, w, τ , iD, pi
and c, d˜ are the associated policy functions,
3. Value function F solves the problem of firm (equation 19) given iL, w, q, Λ and p, l˜,
n, y are the associated policy functions,
4. Government runs a balanced budget,
5. Market clearing and consistency conditions hold,
6. Law of motion of aggregate state variables Γ is consistent with policies of banks and
firms.
2.10 Interbank market shutdown
Let us now discuss economic mechanisms behind the shutdown in the interbank market.
The following proposition specifies the circumstances under which trade in the interbank
market collapses:
Proposition. If St < S∗t then the interbank market collapses (i.e., ψ+ = ψ− = 0), all
borrowers use discount window facility to take loans and all excess reserves earn interest
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iER. The threshold value S∗ is given by:
S∗t =
1 + P (δ ≥ δ∗t ) · (iDW,t − iER,t)
1 + (iDW,t − iER,t) .
Intuition behind this result is straightforward. If S is lower or equal to S∗ then
Fed funds rate iFF is higher or equals discount rate iDW . This implies that banks with
reserve deficits have no incentives to borrow at iFF from banks with surpluses and they
lend from the Fed. Lack of demand for loans forces liquid banks to store liquidity at
the Fed which means that market collapses.
As it has been documented by Afonso et al. (2011), Fed funds market was not frozen
even after the Lehman Brothers collapse so in the simulations I assume that:
∀t S∗t < St ≤ 1.
3 Quantitative analysis
3.1 Calibration
3.1.1 Functional forms
For convenience, I assume that measure µ consists of two points of equal mass situated
at two values that are symmetric with respect to 0:
µ (δ) =

1
2 for δ = δ¯
1
2 for δ = −δ¯
(26)
where δ¯ ∈ (0, 1). Notice that this formulation implies that δ∗ ceases to be relevant and
in equilibrium it always satisfies:
−δ¯ < δ∗ < δ¯.
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Table 1: Parameter values
Parameter Description Value Target
w Real wage 0.91 Number of hours worked equal to 0.33
α Parameter of matching technology M 68.9 Probabilities ψ+ and ψ− equal to 0.99
φ Parameter of price adjustment costs 61.0 Share of adjustment costs in total revenue
equal to 1.22%
iDW Discount window rate 0.0147 Annual discount window rate in 2006
iER Interest on reserves 0 Annual rate on excess reserves in 2006
ξ Capital requirement ratio 0.04 Assets to equity ratio of 4%
ψ Reserve requirement 0.1 Reserve requirement equal to 10%
γ Elasticity of substitution between
varieties
11 Monopolistic markup equal to 10%
βB Banker’s discount factor 0.997 Annual inflation rate equal to 2%
βH Household’s discount factor 0.998 Euler equation consistency
φE Equity adjustment cost 10 Discretionary choice, several other values
checked
δ Std. error of withdrawal shock 0.05 Evidence by Bianchi and Bigio (2014)
ρ Parameter of banker’s preferences 0.5 Discretionary choice, several other values
checked
η Risk aversion - households 2 Standard value in the literature
τ Lump sum tax −0.0002 Balanced budget
m˜ Supply of reserves 0.032 Value of tightness θFF = 1
Utility function u describing preferences of bank unit is specified as:
u (c (δ)) = c (δ)ρ
where ρ ∈ (0, 1). This guarantees that u′ > 0, u′′ < 0 and u (0) = 0 as required before.
Utility function of households u is given by the standard CRRA function:
u˜ (c) = c
1−η − 1
1− η .
Finally, matching technology in labor market M is specified as in Ramey et al. (2000):
M (z1, z2) =
z1 · z2
(zα1 + zα2 )
1
α
where α > 1.
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3.1.2 Parameter values
The time period is a quarter. Targets of my calibration are moments characterizing the
U.S. economy which correspond to values from the model when S is equal to one and
it is constant over time.
Parameter α associated with matching technology is set to match rates ψ+ and ψ−
equal to 0.99. This assumption is motivated by the fact that in normal times a vast
majority of trade in reserves occurs in the interbank market. Real wage w is calibrated
to equalize the number of hours worked equal to 0.33. The moment targeted by the value
of φ is share of price adjustment costs in total annual revenue calculated in Zbaracki
et al. (2004). Values of policy rates iDW and iER in stationary equilibrium are 6% and
0% in annual terms which is consistent with Fed policy rates at the onset of the Great
Recession. I set the value of capital requirement ξ at the level of 4% and the reserve
requirement ψ at the level of 10%. Parameter γ that describes elasticity of substitution
between product varieties is calibrated to match the value 1.1 of monopolistic markup.
Banker’s discount factor βB targets the annual inflation rate of 2% and the analogous
parameter for households - βH - is set to be consistent with steady state value of
interest rate on deposits (see equation 17). The value of parameter φE does not affect
steady state allocation. It does, however, influence the transition path of economy.
Additionally, its value can be treated as policy parameter that can be interpreted the
restrictiveness of capital requirements. I have experimented with various values and I
set φE = 10 in my simulations. In practice I could report simulations for other values
of φE but I think it is not a particularly interesting policy to be discussed here. I set
δ = 0.05 as Bianchi and Bigio (2014) and ρ equals 0.5. I assume that η = 2 - a standard
value in the literature. Tax τ is calibrated to balance the budget. Finally, I set m˜ such
that:
m˜ = ψ · dss. (27)
This value implies that θFF = 1 which reflects the assumption that central banks seeks
to equalize the volumes of surplus and deficit reserves to enhance trade in the interbank
market.
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Figure 2: Baseline simulation: proportion of safe banks, GDP, inflation, interbank
market rates
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3.2 Simulations
In this part, I analyze the transition path of economy that is affected by negative shock
to the proportion of safe banks S. More precisely, I assume that in periods t = 0
economy is in steady state. Next, in the middle of period t = 1, banks learn about the
proportion of risky counterparties 1− St which will default on their interbank loans in
t = 2. The magnitude of shock 1−St is 0.5% at its peak in t = 1 and its autocorrelation
is 0.9. In what follows, I assume that the response of government to a drop in S is
passive: neither interest rate target (pinned down by iDW and iER), nor supply of
reserves change during the crisis. Furthermore, taxes τ and compensations C adjust
automatically according to 23 and 24. Assumption about passive government reaction
is relaxed in Section 4.
I use standard solution methods based on the linear approximation around steady
state because the magnitude of shock guarantees that market shutdown is avoided and
hence the dynamic system preserves differentiability.
Figures 2 and 3 display simulation results. The top left panel of Figure 2 shows the
path of proportion of safe banks S. Notice, that a drop in S in first period increases
counterparty risk in the interbank market in period t = 1 as banks with reserve surpluses
expect defaults on interbank loans in period t = 2. In particular, as formula 14 shows,
a drop in S elevates fed funds rate via the counterparty risk effects in period t = 1
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Figure 3: Baseline simulation: variables associated with the banking sector
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which jumps from 3% to 5% in annual terms. This, in turn, affects borrowing costs
in the interbank market which, combined with concavity of the utility function u and
uninsured shocks δ, increases the riskiness of supplying loans with respect to holding
reserves. As supply of the latter is constant in the baseline scenario price of loans iL
grows.
Since payroll costs are financed with loans then higher iL decreases demand for
loans and so l drops by 3% (see the middle left panel of Figure 3). Real wages are
constant and therefore loans change one for one with employment and output which
implies a drop in GDP by 3%. This, in turn, leads to lower household income. Due
to household’s consumption smoothing motives, agents decrease savings d (the bottom
right panel of Figure 3) which leads to higher rates iD. Despite this upward movement
spread iL − iD gets larger due to the increase in riskiness of financial intermediation
when S contracts. Aggregate equity of the banking sector E lowers in period t =
2 and bounces back sluggishly. Lower equity cushion discourages banks from risky
lending which leads to a prolonged slump in loan supply and output. On the top of
that, interbank market turmoil is associated with persistent deflationary pressure which
decreases annual inflation by about 0.3 percentage points. Amount of compensations C
moves together with S as government guarantees deposits of insolvent bank units and
it reaches the level of 0.45% of GDP.
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Figure 4: Increase in reserve supply during the interbank market turmoil: proportion
of safe banks, GDP, inflation, interbank market rates
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4 Policy interventions
4.1 Change in the supply of reserves
First policy measure considered here is change in reserves that accompanies the drop in
the proportion of safe bank units. More precisely, in response to the contraction in S,
central bank increases the supply of reserves by 10% and then reduces it at rate 0.9 to
mimic the dynamics of shock S which is characterized with the same autocorrelation.
Figure 4 presents the behavior of main economic aggregates. It turns out that the
intervention mitigates the macroeconomic impact of interbank market turmoil as out-
put drops by 2.2% now in comparison to 3% in the baseline scenario. To understand
this result, notice first that interbank market rate iFF remains unaffected by this in-
tervention as it does not decrease the counterparty risk since the number of insolvent
counterparties remains constant. The effects of this policy measure are associated with
the fact that liquidity becomes relatively cheaper as the supply of reserves grows which
increases the probability ψ− and thus reduces the intermediation risk. This implies
that it is less expensive to self insure against withdrawal shocks which stimulates loan
supply. As the system becomes more awash with liquidity, banks’ self insurance mo-
tives leading to equity accumulation weaken and hence the drainage of capital cushion
is more severe. The fact that idiosyncratic risk is mitigated by larger supply of liquidity
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Figure 5: Increase in reserve supply during the interbank market turmoil: variables
associated with the banking sector
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is reflected by a less dynamic increase in iL − iD spread. Finally, intervention tends to
lower the deflationary pressure as the drop in inflation rate is almost two times smaller
now.
4.2 Interbank market guarantees
Let us analyze the effects of interbank market guarantees. This policy was introduced
in several developed economies during the Great Recession. As reported by Heider
et al. (2015), one example is Italy, where the Banca di Italia has established the Mer-
cato Interbancario Collateralizzato (MIC). Despite the fact that its trading activity is
actually collateralized, the Banca di Italia guaranteed repayment of all loans in the
facility because of credit risk concerns associated with uncertain collateral values.
In what follows I assume that central bank sets parameter P ∈ (0, 1) which denotes
the proportion of non-performing interbank loans that are guaranteed. This means that
government commits itself to cover 100 · P % of losses generated by banks lending in
the interbank market. The difference between compensations C in the baseline scenario
and compensations C (P) paid when interbank guarantees are in place is:
Ct (P)− Ct = P · (1− St−1) · ψ+t−1 · St−1 ·
1 + iFF,t−1 − iER,t−1
Πt
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Figure 6: Interbank market guarantees: proportion of safe banks, GDP, inflation, in-
terbank market rates
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which is the proportion P of all interbank loans (with interest) that were not repaid.
More importantly, from the point of view of the impact on economy, guarantees
affect borrowing costs in the interbank market:
iFF,t (P) =
iER,t + iDW,t + (1−P)·(1−St)St+P·(1−St)−P(δ≥δ∗t )
2
which is derived in the Appendix. More precisely, guarantees decrease the counterparty
risk component of the Fed funds rate. The last object which is affected by interbank
market guarantees is the formula for χ+ (S) which now becomes:
χ+t (St−1) =
St−1 − P
(
δ ≥ δ∗t−1
)
+ P · (1− St−1)
P (δ < δ∗t−1)
· ψ+t−1 ·
iFF,t−1 − iER,t−1
Πt
+(1− P) · (1− St−1)
P (δ < δ∗t−1)
· ψ+t−1 ·
(
−1 · 1Πt
)
,
i.e., interbank market guarantees increase the probability of obtaining a return on
lending which is associated with normal times (when S = 1).
Figures 6 and 7 display the results of the simulation for P = 0.5. Introduction of
interbank market guarantees leads to a substantial reduction in the severity of economic
slump generated by the interbank market turmoil. More precisely, the drop in aggregate
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Figure 7: Interbank market guarantees: variables associated with the banking sector
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output is about 50% smaller than in baseline scenario. To see why this is the case
observe that increase in P reduces Fed funds rate when S < 1 and hence its rise is
much more moderate as it increases only up to 3.7% instead of reaching the level of
5%. This, in turn, lowers the cost of withdrawal risk which coupled with the fact
that counterparty risk is already reduced leads to a less severe drop in the supply of
loans. Moreover, as the risk faced by banks is smaller than in baseline scenario (which
is captured by a less dynamic rise in spread iL − iD), banks’ precautionary motives
weaken which implies that they allow for a larger drainage of aggregate equity E. As it
has been already mentioned, interbank market guarantees generate compensation costs
C (P) that are strictly higher than C but the magnitude of this difference as a proportion
of GDP is negligible because m˜ is a small proportion of d (according to 27) and hence the
size of the interbank market is small in comparison to total bank assets. Introduction
of interbank market guarantees leads to weaker deflationary pressure which is almost
three times smaller than in baseline simulation.
5 Conclusions
In this paper I have studied the macroeconomic consequences of interbank market
turmoils and the effects of two policy measures: higher supply of reserves and interbank
market guarantees. To this end I have developed a novel dynamic model of banking
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sector in which banks trade liquidity in frictional OTC market as in Afonso and Lagos
(2015) which has been embedded into an otherwise standard New Keynesian framework.
I have found that even changes in the proportion of risky banks that are relatively
small can have large and prolonged macroeconomic consequences as they elevate levels
of interest rates in the interbank market which, in turn, translate into higher costs
of managing liquidity risk. Finally, I have analyzed the effects of: a 10% increase in
the supply of reserves and introduction of interbank market guarantees. It has turned
out that both policy tools are effective in fighting the slump resulting from interbank
market turmoils.
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Appendix
Bargaining in the market without counterparty risk
It is assumed that the size ∆ of a borrowing (lending) order is infinitesimal. This
guarantees that: i) a trader that trades it for a bank unit can ignore his own impact
on other trades, ii) he can formulate his expectations about the results of other trades
using the Law of Large Numbers, iii) the Nash bargaining problem has a tractable
solution (see Bianchi and Bigio (2014) and Atkeson et al. (2015) for more details). By
V let us denote the value of nominal earnings E for a bank unit at the end of night.
Trade surplus of a borrowing order S− (∆) is given by (notice that the outside option
in the bargaining process is the trade with central bank):
S− (∆) = V (E − (iFF − iER) ·∆)− V (E − (iDW − iER) ·∆) .
If it is divided by ∆ and if we pass to the limit ∆→ 0 we get:
S− (∆)
∆ =
V (E − (iFF − iER) ·∆)− V (E)− V (E − (iDW − iER) ·∆) + V (E)
∆
= (iDW − iER) · V (E)− V (E − (iDW − iER) ·∆)(iDW − iER) ·∆
− (iFF − iER) · V (E)− V (E − (iFF − iER) ·∆)(iFF − iER) ·∆ → (iDW − iER) · V
′ (E) .
Expression for S−(∆)∆ is very useful when solving the Nash bargaining problem. A unit
of surplus S+ (∆) reads:
S+ (∆) = V (E + (iFF − iER) ·∆)− V (E + (iER − iER) ·∆) .
Again, we derive an expression which is very helpful afterwards - the limit of S+(∆)∆ :
S+ (∆)
∆ =
V (E + (iFF − iER) ·∆)− V (E)
∆
= (iFF − iER) · V (E + (iFF − iER) ·∆)− V (E)(iFF − iER) ·∆
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→ (iFF − iER) · V ′ (E) .
While solving the Nash bargaining problem observe that (I assume equal bargaining
weights of 12):
arg max
iFF
([
lim
∆→0
(
S− (∆)
)] 12 · [ lim
∆→0
(
S+ (∆)
)] 12)
= arg max
iFF
[ lim
∆→0
(S− (∆))
∆
] 1
2
·
[
lim
∆→0
(S+ (∆))
∆
] 1
2

= arg max
iFF
(
[(iDW − iER)]
1
2 · [(iFF − iER)]
1
2
)
which implies the following first order condition:
iFF =
iDW + iER
2 .
Bargaining in the market with counterparty risk
Since there are no insolvent units in the pool of units with reserve surpluses, we can
rewrite the formula for S− (∆):
S− (∆) = V (E − (iFF − iER) ·∆)− V (E − (iDW − iER) ·∆) .
Similarly, we can use previous computations to get:
S− (∆)
∆ = (iDW − iER) · V
′ (E) .
The expected surplus of a unit with positive reserve balances is now:
S+ (∆) = S − P (δ ≥ δ
∗)
P (δ < δ∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Proportion of
safe borrowers
· [V (E + (iFF − iER) ·∆)− V (E + (iER − iER) ·∆)]
+ 1− S
P (δ < δ∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Proportion of
risky borrowers
· [V (E −∆)− V (E + (iER − iER) ·∆)] .
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Observe that a unit with surplus loses entire sum of the interbank loan ∆ if it lends to
a risky/insolvent counterparty. Let us calculate S+ (∆) /∆ now:
S+ (∆)
∆ =
S − P (δ ≥ δ∗)
P (δ < δ∗) · (iFF − iER) ·
V (E + (iFF − iER) ·∆)− V (E)
(iFF − iER) ·∆
+ 1− S
P (δ < δ∗) ·
(
−V (E)− V (E −∆)∆
)
→ S − P (δ ≥ δ
∗)
P (δ < δ∗) · (iFF − iER) · V
′ (E)− 1− S
P (δ < δ∗) · V
′ (E)
when ∆→ 0. Analogously to the case without counterparty risk:
arg max
iFF
([
lim
∆→0
(
S− (∆)
)] 12 · [ lim
∆→0
(
S+ (∆)
)] 12)
= arg max
iFF
[ lim
∆→0
(S− (∆))
∆
] 1
2
·
[
lim
∆→0
(S+ (∆))
∆
] 1
2

= arg max
iFF
[(iDW − iER)] 12 ·
[
S − P (δ ≥ δ∗)
P (δ < δ∗) · (iFF − iER)−
1− S
P (δ < δ∗)
] 1
2

and the associated first order condition reads:
iFF =
iER + iDW + 1−SS−P(δ≥δ∗)
2 .
Steady state of the model: algorithm
I present the algorithm that finds the steady state (i.e., for S = 1) of the model and
calibrates several parameters.
1. Guess iguessL and i
guess
D
2. Calibrate βB consistent with iguessL and targeted inflation from the banker’s Euler
equation 6.
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3. Calibrate βH consistent with iguessD and targeted inflation from the household’s
Euler equation 17.
4. Use Λ = βH , iguessL and Π induced by targeted inflation to calibrate w consistent
with firm’s FOC 21.
5. Compute l from the firm’s constraint:
l = w · n.
6. Use Π, targeted number of hours worked and iguessL to compute firm’s profits pi.
7. Construct a linear system of 7 equations: 2 for δ = δ¯ and δ = −δ¯, bank balance
sheet constraint 3, household’s budget constraint 16, relationship 27 pinned down
by θFF = 1, capital requirements 25 and government’s constraint 23 with C = 0
and solve for 7 unknowns: c
(
δ¯
)
, c
(
−δ¯
)
, c, m, d, e and τ .
8. Use 4 and 5 to compute iL and iD. Modify iguessL and i
guess
D towards iL and iD and
start from the first step. Iterate until convergence.
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